Are data brokers putting US House members at risk?

In the face of an increasing number of challenges to the security of some of the most prominent political figures in the US, it’s important to examine the role of personal-data availability in creating security vulnerabilities for such individuals.

Members of the US House are high-profile individuals by necessity and can often be highly polarizing public figures. Risk metrics for physical, financial, and reputational harm skyrocket when detailed, up-to-date treasure troves of personal data are introduced into a politically charged atmosphere. Thanks to the efforts of data brokers in general and people search sites specifically, a comprehensive dossier on a given House member is just a web search away.

Yet, there’s no comprehensive federal law protecting US citizens from such data collection and dissemination. Only a few states, notably including Texas and California, have laws on the books specifically protecting House members’ home addresses and personal information from public disclosure. Even then, these laws often operate on an opt-out basis, meaning that members of Congress have to proactively request that their information be removed. 
We conducted a study focusing on the availability of US House members’ personal information on some of the largest people search sites (PSS) known to operate in the United States to underline the problem of how easy it is to access the personal data of not only the most influential people in the country but of everyone living in the US. 

Key insights

• A staggering 75% of House members’ personal data can very likely be found on people search sites. This data can include home addresses, phone numbers, relatives, property records, and even neighbors.
• Male Republican House members are at the highest risk of being exposed on people search sites—our researchers found the probable records of 79.79% of male Republican House members compared to 73.98% of male Democrat House members. 
• Records for female Republican House members were likely to be found on PSS least often, but still in a significant 61.76% of cases.
• Records on people search sites can be found for all House members from Arkansas, Georgia, Iowa, Michigan, Nevada, Oregon, Tennessee, and Utah (with a 75% or greater probability*).
• The least exposed data is that of House members from Connecticut, New York, Indiana, Minnesota, Washington, Arizona, and South Carolina—data likely belonging to less than 60% of House members from these states can be found on people search sites, still a significant proportion.

¹Methodology described below

Some context—people search sites

People search sites (PSS), also known as people finder sites, compile detailed profiles—sometimes called “background reports”—on people and then sell access to these reports to anyone who’s willing and able to pay for them. Although most of these operations include disclaimers prohibiting visitors and customers from using the information in these reports for illegal ends, there are generally no mechanisms in place to prevent inappropriate or illegal use.

People search sites are a type of data broker. Data brokers specialize in the aggregation of and trade in personal data. What sets PSS apart from other data brokers is the fact that they sell data directly to the public through search-engine indexed, searchable, online databases of profiles. Most other kinds of data brokers sell personal information on a business-to-business basis, and the profiles they deal in do not show up in regular web searches.

A person need not be aware of people search sites or know of any particular such sites in order to find someone’s personal information. Given how well these sites are typically positioned on popular search engines, it’s often enough to perform a web search for someone’s full name, address, or phone number. The presence of profiles on public figures like House members is particularly concerning. 

Results and analysis

Incogni’s researchers checked dozens of people search sites for profiles belonging to each member in the sample. These checks were performed using publicly available data: each House member’s full name, date of birth, and, where available, their current state and city of residence. For every individual data point, matches were ranked on a scale of 1 – 100. Match rankings for every data point were then averaged and presented as an overall match ranking, expressed as a percentage.

We found that over 75% of House members were very likely to have their information available on people search sites. By a slim margin, the majority of such profiles belong to Republicans (171 profiles versus 158 Democrat profiles). 

PSS exposure affects both sides of the aisle

Incogni’s researchers parsed the available data, looking for patterns. Breaking the data down by party affiliation, we arrived at the following results:

The sample was composed of 50.8% Republicans and 49.2% Democrats, with 52% of those House members likely to appear on people search sites being Republicans and 48% Democrats. This suggests a lack of significant correlation between party affiliation and exposure on PSS.

Republican congressmen are slightly more likely to appear on PSS

Overlaying a breakdown of House members by gender reveals some possible correlations:

Democrat congressmen and congresswomen are approximately equally likely to appear on people search sites. The results for Republicans are more striking: whereas 61.8% of Republican congresswomen are likely to be found on PSS, 79.8% of Republican congressmen are. The significance of this is unclear. It’s also unclear if this is part of a trend or something that’s associated with these particular Republican congressmen.

Republican congresswomen are less likely to appear on PSS

Decomposing the data along both gender and party lines reveals another surprising result.

Interestingly, Republican congresswomen are the least likely of the four groups to have their personal information displayed on people search sites. This could be a result of more female Republican House members having had their personal data removed from PSS.

Data removal is achievable, if difficult, so it’s entirely possible that a significant proportion of Republican congresswomen took the extra steps necessary to have their data removed, either as a preventive measure or in response to threats or other incidents.

Bias on the part of the PSS under examination seems unlikely since their profit motives dictate collecting as much data concerning as many people as possible.

Congressional PSS exposure by state

Breaking the data down by state, perhaps the most notable result that comes to light is just how exposed House members are.

We saw a concentration of highly exposed members of the House in the Northwest. We also observed 22 states and territories where all of the representatives were available on PSS (with a 75% or greater probability, see Methodology).

The kinds of personal data exposed by these particular PSS

There’s some variation in the kinds of personal information that people search sites deal in. Some are little more than digitized phonebooks, with names, addresses, and phone numbers. Most, though, offer shockingly detailed profiles that cover everything from the subjects’ court records to their sexual orientation.

The lists above represent the data points each people search site advertises as being included in its service. Each PSS may not necessarily hold every data point on every House member caught in its operations, but these lists give a good indication of the extent of the data displayed on a typical profile. 

It doesn’t take much imagination to see the risk in data points like these being publicly available, for anyone, much less high-profile, often-polarizing figures like congressional representatives. Even “just” an address and a phone number might pose a significant risk for a targeted individual.

The full suite of data points offered by PSS 9 could be used to craft extremely effective spear-phishing campaigns to defraud or otherwise deceive a member of the House. Many of these data points are part of the public record, but it’s the way people search sites make them quick and easy to find that’s concerning. Searching through public records, which often involves submitting requests and contacting multiple courts and clerk’s offices, won’t deter highly motivated and obsessively focused perpetrators, but it will certainly hamper the efforts of the more disorganized and impulsive perpetrators. 

Conclusion

Other than some potentially interesting findings concerning male and female Republican House members, the most telling conclusion we can draw from our findings is that people search sites, like most data brokers, are indiscriminate when it comes to who gets caught up in their dragnets. These are operations from which everyone needs protection, but especially those whose careers put them in the public spotlight and whose decisions are likely to cause ire among parts of the public.

With no comprehensive, federal data-protection legislation in place, House members—like the general public—are left with only a scant patchwork of state legislation and their own initiative to rely on. The public record is instrumental in securing the functioning of a robust democracy and allowing capitalism to flourish. Data brokers, in monetizing access to the public record, are simultaneously, even if entirely unintentionally, making it easier for bad actors to access and exploit it.

Whereas regular citizens face dangers mostly associated with fraud and harassment, the balance shifts decidedly towards risks of physical harm for the most prominent people in the country. Congresspeople, like judicial and law-enforcement staff, also need to be able to make decisions free of duress or fear of reprisal. This certainly presents an argument for greater protections being enshrined in law for people in such positions of public office, authority, and trust.

Study methodology

Incogni’s researchers examined what data is available online regarding US politicians—specifically members of the House. The sample was derived on July 15, 2024, and included 437 representatives, including non-voting delegates and excluding three vacant seats. 

Incogni checked dozens of people search sites for each member in the sample using publicly available data: each House member’s full name, date of birth, and, where available, their current state and city of residence. This initial personal data was found either on the government website congress.gov/members or Ballotpedia. If a state or city of residence was unavailable, we used the representative’s birthplace. 

We then checked dozens of people search sites for each member in our sample, using this publicly available data to perform the searches.

For this study, we chose 75% as the match probability at which we deemed a member of the House discoverable on people search sites. For every individual data point we used to query the PSS—name, surname, age, city, and state of residence—a match ranking in the 1 – 100 range was assigned. In cases where personal details were found to be a partial match, such as a slight difference in age or spelling variations, the match ranking for that data point fell below 100. The algorithm determines a match ranking for every data point based on the magnitude of the difference between a query and its potential match. The match rankings for every data point are then averaged and presented as an overall match ranking, expressed as a percentage. 

Manually checking a random sample of results with the threshold probability of 75% (we checked 15/172 such results), we found that 93% were, in fact, matches. 

Given that we observed numerous correct matches at lower probabilities (6/15 at 70%, for example),  we believe that potential false positives are compensated for by uncounted matches (those with a probability below the 75% threshold).

Public data

Due to the nature of our research for this particular study, we’ve limited what data we make publicly available. Anonymized research materials are available here.

Sources

Congress.Gov. “Members of the U.S. Congress.” Accessed July 15, 2024. https://www.congress.gov/members.

Ballotpedia. “List of current members of the U.S. Congress.” Accessed July 15, 2024. https://ballotpedia.org/List_of_current_members_of_the_U.S._Congress.